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Privacy by design1 This paper in notably based on the CRID’s
the programme launched by the Federal Min
communicatiewetenschappen (UA), CITA an
(Cyberteens and cybertools), published by BE
0267-3649/$ e see front matter ª 2011 Profe
doi:10.1016/j.clsr.2010.11.011a b s t r a c t
The present paper1 aims both at introducing the legal aspects of the protection of minors in
cyberspace and analysing and criticizing certain main features embedded in this legal
approach of young people protection. After a short introduction underlining the concept of
child’s rights and the reason why this right has been particularly proclaimed in the context
of the cyberspace, the first section describes the new technological features of the ICT
environment and linked to this evolution the increasing risks the minors are confronted
with. A typology of cyber abuses is proposed on the basis of these considerations. A list of
EU or Council of Europe texts directly or indirectly related to the minors’ protection into the
cyberspace is provided. The second section intends to analyse certain characteristics of the
legal approach as regards the ways by which that protection is conceived and effectively
ensured. Different principles and methods might be considered as keywords summarizing
the legal approach and to a certain extent, fixing a partition of responsibilities taking fully
into account the diversity of actors might be deduced from the different regulatory
documents.
The third section comes back to the different complementary means by which the Law is
envisaging the minors’ protection. The obligation to create awareness about the potential
risks minors might incur definitively is the first one. The omnipresent reference in all the
legal texts to the role of self-regulatory interventions constitutes another pillar of the
protection envisaged by the Law. After having described the multiple instruments devel-
oped in the context of this self-regulation (labels, codes of conduct, hotlines, ODR...) or even
co-regulation, the paper examines the conditions set by the European legislators as regards
these instruments. Technology might be considered as a fourth method for protecting
children. Our concern will be to see how the Law is addressing new requirements as
regards the technological solutions and their implementation. The present debates about
the liability of the actors involved in applications or services targeted or not vis-à-vis the
minors like SNS or VSP operators are evoked. As a final point the question of the increasing
competences of LEA and the reinforcement of the criminal provisions in order to fight
cyber abuses against minors will be debated. In conclusion, we will address final recom-
mendations about the way by which it would be possible to reconcile effective minors’
protection and liberties into the cyberspace.
ª 2011 Professor Yves Poullet. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.research achieved in the context of the TIRO research project carried out in the context of
istry of Science and Policy (BELSPO) and conducted together with SMIT (VUB), Department
d CRID (University of Namur). See the report TIRO, Teens and ICT: Risks and Opportunities
LSPO, 2008.
ssor Yves Poullet. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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A quotation of the 2/2009 opinion of the Art. 29 WP (WP 160)
enacted in February 2009 about Data Protection and Minors
illustrates the main reason why legislators are particularly
concerned about granting protection to minors:
“From the static point of view, the child is a person who has not
yet achieved physical and psychological maturity. From the
dynamic point of view, the child is in the process of developing
physically and mentally to become an adult. The right of the
children and the exercise of these rights, including that of data
protection, should be expressed in a way which recognizes these
two perspectives.”
In other words to take again the NUSSBAUM’s approach,2
the Law has to ensure the conditions for the development of
human capabilities, that is to say not the actual achievements
of persons but the freedom of persons to achieve the devel-
opment of his or her personality (his or her ipse).3 Insofar as
the child’s development may be favoured by the use of ICT, at
the same time it can be compromised by it. Consequently, the
Lawhas to take certain initiatives to avoid eventswhichmight
jeopardize this development. If it is not contested the over-
whelmingly positive potential of the Internet is evident: that is
to inform, entertain and educate children. At the same time
a totally free internet for children and young people might2 See notably, M. Nussbaum, Capabilities and Human right
Fordham Law review, 66 (1997), 273e290.
3 Under our opinion, Law is achieving this task through th
privacy concept in the broadest sense. “The two aspects
freedom from unreasonable constraints (from the State or from
others) in the construction of one’s identity, and control ove
(some) aspects of the identity one projects to the world e are a
the heart of what the various ’facets’ of privacy are all abou
Yet, more fundamentally, and against the common view tha
the ’freedom in the construction of one’s personality’ an
’control over information about oneself one projects on th
world’ pursue different, though complementary, normativ
goals, we would like to argue that their common normativ
justification and objective, or, to say it more plainly, the fin
value they are meant to advance, is the capacity of the huma
subject to keep and develop his personality in a manner tha
allows him to fully participate in society without howeve
being induced to conform his thoughts, beliefs, behaviours an
preferences to those thoughts, beliefs, behaviours and prefe
ences held by the majority. Privacy and data protection regime
should thus be understood as ’mere’ tools (evolving whe
required by the new threats that socio-economic, cultura
and technological changes impose on individual and demo
cratic self-determination), meant to pursue that one sing
common goal: sustaining the uniquely human capacity fo
individual reflexive self-determination and for collectiv
deliberative decision making regarding the rules of soci
cooperation.” (A. Rouvroy and Y. Poullet, The right to info
mational self-determination and the value of self-developmen
Reassessing the importance of privacy for democracy, i
Reinventing Data Protection, Proceedings of the 2nd CPD
Conference, Brussels 2009, Gutwirth, Poullet et al (eds





























),lead to obvious harms including sexual abuse of children,
harassment, grooming, potential contact abuses and financial
damage.4 Even if children are to a certain extent “expert users of
online technologies and aware of both risks and ways of dealing with
them, they are not mature in the sense of being able to evaluate the
situations they encounter and the possible consequences their deci-
sion might have”.5
The EU regulatory Action as regards the e-Youth
protection takes place in the context of the EU Commis-
sion Declaration on Children’s rights dated from 20066
designated as a priority for the EU: “A particular priority
must be effective protection of the rights of the children against
economic exploitation and all forms of abuse, with the Union
acting as a beacon for the rest of the world”. This Declaration
pleads in favour of effective measures around different
tools:
 more comprehensive analysis of the needs and priorities
and of the impact of relevant EU actions undertaken so far;
 more efficient mainstreaming of children’s rights in EU
policies, strategies or programmes and enhanced coordi-
nation within the European Commission;
 better cooperation with key stakeholders, including
children;
 stronger communication and increased awareness of chil-
dren’s rights and of EU actions in this field.
In that context, protection of young people is considered as
a major issue. According to data released by the EU Commis-
sion,7 in the UK during the period 1997e2005, the number of
sites with child abusematerial increased by 1.500 percent and
Interpol’s Child abuse Image Database contains 550.000
images of 20.000 children. All these abuses are obviously
perpetrated against children, but what must be noticed is that
children are not the only victims but increasingly the perpe-
trators themselves. Before addressing a typology of these
abuses, it would be interesting to understand the causal link
one might establish between the new technological features
of online services and the increasing risks incurred by young
people.
Different trends might be underlined as regards the
development of ICT. New significant characteristics are often
developed, but besides this there are also new applications
and roles played by new actors exploiting these technological4 See SAFER INTERNET FORUM REPORT, “Safer Internet and Online
Technologies for Children”, 20e21 June 2007.
5 Proposal for a Decision of the EU Parliament and of the
Council establishing a multi-annual Community Programme on
protecting Children using the Internet and other communication
technologies, Brussels 27. 2.2008 COM (2008)106 final, Explanatory
Memorandum, p. 2. See also, the JRC Scientific and Technical
report published in 2009 about “Young people and Emerging Digital
Services e An Exploratory Survey on Motivations, Perceptions and
Acceptance of Risks”, p. 9.
6 Communication from the Commission - Towards an EU
strategy on the rights of the child {SEC(2006) 888} {SEC(2006)
889}/*COM/2006/0367 final.
7 See the Explanatory Memorandum of the Proposal mentioned
footnote 4. For other alarming ciphers, see http://www.
eukidsonline.net/.
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might be identified:
 About Moore’s Law - The development of ICT can be firstly
described in a continuous and tremendous growth of
computer and communication systems capacities. The
so-called Moore’s Law predicts that every 18 months the
storage capacity of a computer is multiplied by two for
the same price, which implies the multiplication by 1000 in
fifteen years. It is becoming possible to store on a personal
computer the records of all the events of my life and to set-
up a central GRID collecting the basic identification data of
all people around the world. This capacity of storage
doubled by an increasing capacity of processing and trans-
mission explains how Google can validate your request,
scanning in less than 10 s more than a thousand million
sites worldwide. It explains also the development of what
we call the Web 2.0 multimedia applications like YouTube,
Dailymotion, etc.
 Internet revolution - The Internet revolution might be
described fromdifferent points of view. The global character
of this network has a doublemeaning. It means not only the
universal dimension of this infrastructure, implying the
interoperability of technical norms.8 Internet also leads to
the convergence of all networks, which were traditionally
clearly separated like TV channels and mobile infrastruc-
ture and thus the possibility to cross match the data created
by all these communication activities. That convergence is
doubled by the convergence of the terminal. Our mobile
devices and computers are achieving today activities like
voice telephony services, TV or radio programmes recep-
tion, e-mails communications, etc. which 30 years ago were
reserved to specific and dedicated terminals. The fact that
a younger generation fans of these kinds of terminals might
use them without parental and teacher control creates new
risks everywhere.
 Ambient Intelligence - Ambient Intelligence9 is perhaps the
most recent outcome of the ICT evolution. With the minia-
turization of terminals into “smart dust” and their implan-
tation into objects, clothes and even on or within our own
bodies, it is now possible to conceive interaction among
human beings and their environment through the “Internet
of Things”. The technology is becoming ubiquitous covering
all the events of our everyday life. We also speak of
a “learning technology” insofar as it is able to adapt its8 An additional effort to coordinate infrastructure is being
propelled by the European Organization for Nuclear Research (or
“CERN”, Europe’s scientific consortium where the World Wide
Web was born). CERN’s Large Hadron Collider Computing Grid
project includes a plan “to integrate thousands of computers
worldwide into a global computing resource,” or Grid. The
project’s most enthusiastic proponents contend: “The Grid goes
well beyond simple communication between computers and aims ulti-
mately to turn the global network of computers into one vast compu-
tational resource.”
9 “The central idea of these networks is to create environments in
which people are surrounded by intelligent intuitive interfaces that are
embedded in all kinds of objects. It is an environment that is capable of
recognizing and responding to the presence and actions of different
individuals in a seamless, unobtrusive and often, invisible way using
several senses”.functioning to the data obtained through its use. The
networks created by the dialogue between things, among
things or between things and people create a space
progressively invested by ICTs.
 Digital identities - “Digital identities” are increasingly
linked to individuals or to be more precise with their
bodies (biometric data); or with objects under their control
or use e.g. the personal computer or the communication
means employed (cookies or IP addresses); tag numbers
as regards RFID10 enshrined in clothes etc.) or simply
with works or things whether or not belonging to the
individuals concerned.11 One underlines the different
roles of these “digital identities”. They firstly might be
used as “authentication” tools, especially to permit the
access to certain resources. Secondly they are essential for
the reconstruction of an informational image about
a person e whether identified or not - apart from pieces of
information scattered in databases and geographically
dispersed through the network and without limitation of
borders. In other words they permit the traceability (the
capacity to follow the movement of a person, a good or
a message) and more the ability to establish links among
different databases in order to retrieve the information
concerning the same individual identified or not (e.g.
cookies, RFID tag number, etc).12 Digital identifiers (like IP
address, RFID tag number) permit also contact with people
by sending appropriate messages. That triple character-
istic of digital identifiers, linkability, traceability and
contactability, explains why special attention must be
given to that kind of data, which at first glance seem less
sensitive than biographic data. Finally, it should be noted
that biometric data are available during the entire life of
the individual, precisely because they are directly linked
to the body, in which traces revealing DNA can be found
very easily (blood, hair, etc).
As regards now the applications and the actors, the
following points can be made:
 User Generated Content - User Generated Content’s appli-
cations definitively constitute, from the Internet users’
point of view, the most prominent new applications on
the Web. About 60% of the content available on the web is
coming from these new applications, like social networks,10 RFID ¼ Radio Frequency IDentifier.
11 See the Object Names System (ONS) put into place by GSI in
the context of a large development of RFID and in a way quite
similar to that chosen for the DNS operated by ICANN with the
cooperation of Verisign. ONS will permit to trace a product to
know exactly the producer, distributor, the ingredients, etc.
Placed at a certain distance of a reader which might be the
mobile, it permits a consumer to know exactly the product he or
she is purchasing.
12 Digital identities might be considered as “matching identi-
fiers”. “Matching identifier” refers to an item of information
making it possible to identify the same individual in two data
processing operations, each of which has a different file
controller or a distinct purpose. Items of personal data include
matching identifiers such as cookies which enable individuals to
be recognised and their actions or movements to be tracked over
time, whether in cyberspace or not.
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under the concept of Web 2.0 applications. These
emerging applications radically transform the relation-
ships among the actors. In the traditional scheme, the role
of the information service provider on one side and the
role of the Internet users on the other are quite distin-
guished and the regulation available is normally reserved
only to professionals. At issue is what happens when
Internet users, including young people, in the context of
these new applications, play the same role as traditional
information providers when posting news on their blogs
or on YouTube and become data controllers by putting
information online about themselves and about third
parties? Can we consider that the author of a blog is
a journalist or an editor, subject to the same deontology
and legal duties that the press must adhere to? New risks
and threats derive from the very sensitive nature of the
data they are posting, and the illicit or harmful informa-
tion they are diffusing, etc. The privacy risks created by
the use of these data by third parties in the context of
certain secondary uses must be highlighted.
 Profiling techniques - More specifically profiling tech-
niques13 seem to be more and more used by companies or
administrations. Profiling might be defined as a compu-
terised method involving data mining from data ware-
houses, which may facilitate the placing of individuals,
with a certain degree of probability, and hence with
certain induced error rates, in a particular category in
order to take individual decisions relating to them. Taking
the opportunity of the huge number of traces generated by
Internet users in addition to their use of communications
services and using data collected just-in-time - thanks
to the technologies and coming from a large variety of
sources - companies or administrations are defining
profiles and apply these profiles to individuals in order to
take decisions towards individuals whether identified or
not. “Adaptive pricing” is often quoted in that context.
According to the profile of the customer, the information
service provider might decide to adapt the price of
a service or a product. One-to-one marketing is largely
based on that technique and more and more administra-
tions are detecting presumed smugglers or terrorists using
that method.
 New actors: the intermediaries - Before discussing the impli-
cations of these applications as regards our fundamental
liberties, we would like to underline the increasing role of
intermediaries. By intermediaries, we mean all the activities13 R. Brownsword, ‘Knowing Me, Knowing YoudProfiling,
Privacy and the Public Interest’ in M. Hildebrandt and S. Gut-
wirth (eds), Profiling the European Citizen, Dordrecht, Springer,
2008, pp. 362e382. The Council of Europe has adopted very
recently a recommendation about profiling: Recommendation
CM/Rec(2010)13 of the Committee of Ministers to member states
on the protection of individuals with regard to automatic pro-
cessing of personal data in the context of profiling, Adopted
by the Committee of Ministers on 23 November 2011.This recom-
mendation is published at: https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?
Ref¼CM/Rec%282010%2913&Language¼lanFrench&Site¼CM&Back
ColorInternet¼C3C3C3&BackColorIntranet¼EDB021&BackColor
Logged¼F5D383.which render useful the usage of the applications. It might
be platforms offering the Web 2.0 services, search engines
or all communications services providers as well as oper-
ators intervening in support of these communication
services like certification providers. These persons play
a decisive role by providing added-value services, but at the
same time might be considered as gatekeepers to the
information provided by or to Internet’s users. They are
ranking the information, facilitating the access to that
information and, in certain cases, selecting the information
offered.
To what extent might they be held liable in case of diffusion
of illicit or illegal messages by their platform? The question
has recently been raised after the diffusion on YouTube
of images provided by a future Finnish killer.14 Two addi-
tional remarks need to be made: firstly, the economy of the
functioning of these services is often quite obscure, since
they are using the information they collect for their own
benefit or the benefit of a third party by developing marketing
operations or other added-value services; secondly, law
enforcement authorities might be tempted to cooperate with
such services providers in order to find potential suspects in
criminal affairs.
Starting from that short overview of technological features
and actors, we list different cyber abuses youngsters might
suffer in a cyberspace environment. It is quite clear that the
borders between these different abuses are unclear and that
there are a lot of overlaps.
 As regards the financial and economic interests, we have pin-
pointed how companies might use one-to-one marketing
techniques in order to solicit adequately the young people.
Beyond that a lot of services (videogames, phone.) are
‘offered’ taking advantage of childhood addictions. The
instantaneous character of Internet transactions enhance
the risk that children will not resist to the temptations so
easily accessible. Finally, we pinpoint the risks linked with
transactions at distance (lack of knowledge as regards the
vendor, the quality of the product and the security of
payment) which are increasing since everybody now,
including young people, sell products or services on the net
through developed transactional platforms.
 As regards human dignity, as previously said (see above,),
paedophilia, sexual abuses including grooming activities,
xenophobia, moral or sexual harassment are more and
more committed through Internet applications.
 As regards data protection and privacy, firstly, it is clear that
particularly with web 2.0 applications each of us but
particularly the children are invited (and more and more
feel obliged by social pressure) to be present on the net
with a maximum of data about themselves and the events
of their social life, including data about their friends,
relatives and more generally about their social environ-
ment. Secondly, the huge capacities of data storage and
processing are multiplying the possibility of profiling14 The 18 year old Pekka-Erik Auvinen in November 2007, see for
instance timesonline, “Finish” YouTube Killer “was bullied at
school”, 8 November 2007.
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uses, profiles or messages for an unlimited time without
taking into account the ‘right’ granted to each of us to be
forgotten.
 As regards now reputation, cyber-bullying and defamation
are becomingmore andmore frequent by the use of the new
applications like blogs, SNS, etc.
 As regards psychological damages caused for instance by
violence sexual nudity, self-mutilation or suicide websites,
their number is increasing not only by the multiplication
of these websites but also because young users are using
their devices in an uncontrolled and isolated environment
and thus might not refer immediately to their parents or
peers.
These offences when compared with their perpetration
in an offline context take on another reality in an online
environment when the unique scope and facilities offered
by Internet technologies come to the fore.15 So the
messages are often more implicit than in an offline envi-
ronment: for instance, xenophobia messages might be
delivered under the format of a game or through appar-
ently scientific studies and it must be emphasised that
these abuses are easier to commit since their author
remains to a certain extent anonymous and since the
technology gives them an opportunity to disseminate very
easily to a large population without the additional distri-
bution costs that their cyber hate messages would nor-
mally induce. Finally we must also pinpoint the fact that,
due to the interactivity of the Internet technology, the
authors are not necessarily fully cognisant of the impact
of their online messages compared to the reaction they
would observe if they were facing their victims or pre-
senting them with a written page.16 Working paper 160 already mentioned above.2. Section 1: the legal environment and its
main principles
In order to face to all these risks, the EU and Council of Europe
have promulgated regulations directly or indirectly aimed at
protecting young people. As regards the first category the
following texts can be identified:
 The Council Recommendation 98/560/EC on the protection
of minors and human dignity in audiovisual and informa-
tion services (1998) that makes recommendations and gives
guidelines on the protection of minors
 This was followed by the European Parliament and Council
Recommendation 2006/952/EC on the protection of minors and
human dignity and on the right of reply, that takes into account
recent technological developments and the changing media
landscape
 The Audiovisual Media Services directive adopted in December
2007 which includes rules for the protection of minors15 See Y. Poullet, «La lutte contre le racisme et la xénophobie sur
Internet», in J.T., 2006, n 6229, pp. 401e412, available on the
website: http://www.droit-technologie.org/dossier-146/la-lutte-
contre-le-racisme-et-la-xenophobie-sur-l-internet.html The Council of Europe Convention on cyber crime (2001)
which aims to facilitate international cooperation in
the detection, investigation and prosecution of cyber
crime
 This was followed by the Council of Europe Convention on the
protection of children against sexual exploitation and sexual abuse
(July 2007), which establishes forms of sexual abuse of
children as criminal offences
 The Council Framework decision 2004/68/JHA on child pornog-
raphy (2004) which sets out the minimum requirements for
Member States in the definition of offences and appropriate
sanctions concerning the production, distribution, dissem-
ination, transmission, making available as well acquisition
and possession of child abuse material. On 25 March 2009
the Commission published the text of a proposal for
a revised Council Framework decision on combating the
sexual abuse, sexual exploitation of children and child
pornography, repealing Framework decision 2004/68/JHA.
This text is before the EU Parliament (see Brussels March 29,
2010, COM (2010)94 final)
 The Commission’s communication COM (2007) 267,
22.5.2007 ‘Towards a general policy on the fight against cyber
crime’ aimed at strengthening operational law enforcement
cooperation in the field of online child sexual abuse mate-
rial, improving international cooperation.
 The Commission’s communication COM (2006) 367, 4.7.2006
‘Towards an EU strategy on the Rights of the Child’ addresses
internal and external policies on children’s rights in
a coherent way, fully consistent with the already existing
Community action plans and programmes.
 The EU “Guidelines for the Promotion and Protection of the
Rights of the Child” (Council Conclusions 16457/07, 12
December 2007) serve as framework for protecting the rights
and integrity of children in third countries.
As regards the legislation indirectly relevant as regards the
protection of children, one can list:
 The directive 95/46 on Data Protection and the more recent
directive 2009 called the e-privacy directive deal with
questions about processing of personal data which is
a major issue in the context of the use by youngsters of web
2.0 applications. Article 29 working Party addressed in Feb.
2009 a Working Paper16 analysing certain issues about the
application of data protection legislations to this specific
question. We might also refer to EDPS opinion on Safer
Internet for Children.17 Among a long list of questions, we
list the following: First, to what extent the “consent”
requirement might be used to legitimate processing about
youngsters? On that point, the answer is unclear and
perhaps it would be interesting to take example from the US17 EDPS, Opinion on the proposal for a decision of the European
Parliament and of the Council establishing a multi-annual
Community programme on protecting children using the Internet
and other communications technologies, June 23, 2008 (O.J. 7.1.
2009 (2009/C 2/02)).
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parental consent as regards children under 13 years.19
Second, it can be argued that the right to be anonymous
has to be enacted quite strongly as regards children since in
the context of the development of their personality it would
be dangerous to keep data over their past and to infer there
from certain information about their present personality?
Other questions arise: can we forbid the profiling of users
registered as under the age of 18?20 Are youngsters to be
viewed as data controllers in the context of Facebook
applications or blogs containing data about relatives, friends
or other people?18 “There is a United States federal law, located at 15 U.S.C.
x6501e6506 (Pub.L. 105e277, 112 Stat. 2581e728, enacted Chil-
dren’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (COPPA) October 21,
1998). The act, effective April 21, 2000, applies to the online
collection of personal information by persons or entities under U.S.
jurisdiction from children under 13 years of age. It details what
a website operator must include in a privacy policy, when and
how to seek verifiable consent from a parent or guardian, and
what responsibilities an operator has to protect children’s privacy
and safety online including restrictions on the marketing to those
under 13. While children under 13 can legally give out personal
information with their parents’ permission, many websites alto-
gether disallow under age children from using their services due
to the amount of paperwork involved. This legislation is to be
distinguished from the COPA, The Child Online Protection Act
(COPA) was a law in the United States of America, passed in 1998
with the declared purpose of restricting access by minors to any
material defined as harmful to such minors on the Internet. The
United States federal courts have ruled that the law violates the
constitutional protection of free speech, and therefore have
blocked it from taking effect. As of 2009, the law remains
unconstitutional and unenforced.” (Wikipedia). The COPPA is in
course of revision. FTC has launched debates about a certain
number of questions to be addressed due to the Internet evolu-
tion and the way children are now using and accessing the
Internet. On that debate and the issues identified by FTC, see FTC
website (http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/03/coppa.shtm).
19 In Europe, a child is defined as a person below the age of 18
years as in the UN Convention on the rights of the Child (UNCRC)
of 20 Nov.1989 (see notably on that point the Communication
from the Commission, “Towards an EU Strategy on the rights of the
Child”, Brussels 4.7.2006, COM(2006) final).
20 On that point see the Art. 3.5 of the recently adopted Council
of Europe recommendation: “‘The collection and processing of
personal data in the context of profiling of persons who cannot
express on their own behalf their free, specific and informed
consent should be forbidden except when this is in the legitimate
interest of the data subject or if there is an overriding public
interest, on the condition that appropriate safeguards are
provided for by law.” (Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)13 of the
Committee of Ministers to member states on the protection of
individuals with regard to automatic processing of personal data
in the context of profiling, adopted by the Committee of Ministers
on 23 November 2010). See also the Council of Europe recommenda-
tion’s preamble: “Considering that the profiling of children may
have serious consequences for them throughout their life, and
given that they are unable, on their own behalf, to give their free,
specific and informed consent when personal data are collected
for profiling purposes, specific and appropriate measures for the
protection of children are necessary to take account of the best
interests of the child and the development of their personality in
accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of
the Child;” The Directives on electronic commerce, on distance
contracts21 and so on are also relevant to children’s activi-
ties on the net. So the question to what extent their consent
might be considered as valid due to their minority remains
questionable and solved differently by EU member state
jurisdictions. Minors’ use of e-payments in the case of
electronic transactions can also be questioned. It needs to
be stated that the 2005 Directive on unfair commercial
practices22 introduces the need to take into account the
categories of population targeted when judging the unfair
character of specific practices. That might be of interest in
case of certain advertisements.
 Finally we have to consider the Directive on IPR and
Internet,23 particularly the Directive on a better reinforce-
ment of the IPR in cyberspace24 which gives the member
states new tools for identifying and fighting illegal copies of
protected materials.
Art. 29 WP in its opinion about privacy and protection of
children identifies three major principles followed by such
legislation and in general the regulatory initiatives coming
from the European Union. The three principles might be
developed as follows.
Best interest: “The principle of best interest requires a proper
appreciation of the position of the child. This involves recognising
two things. First, a child’s immaturity makes them vulnerable, and
this must be compensated by adequate protection and care. Second,
the child’s right to development can only be properly enjoyedwith the
assistance or protection of other entities and/or people (family,
society and state)”. This clear recognition of parental, societal
and public authorities’ duties leads to the recognition of
responsibilities as will be discussed below.
Special attention is reserved by recent texts to discuss
the delicate question of young people profiling or “online
preference marketing”(OPM).25 As said above young people
are uploading a lot of data on the web which might be of
great interest for service providers or third parties, like
employers or law enforcement authorities, for addressing
targeted advertisements and/or taking decisions about
them. The profiling techniques might be used in that
context. That usage might lead to harm since the youngster
is identified to a profile at a moment when his or her
personality is not yet fixed resulting in possible harm to his
or her development. Another point to be underlined is that
this storage of past events in this life period might create
prejudice since certain past bad actions might be stored
which might consequently affect the judgement of third
parties. That is why the right to be anonymous and to be21 Electronic Commerce Directive of June 8, 2000 and Distance
Contracts Directive of May 20, 1997.
22 Unfair Commercial Practices Directive of May 11, 2005.
23 Directive of May 22, 2001 on copyright and related rights in the
information society.
24 Directive of April 29, 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual
property rights.
25 FTC speaks about “OPM” rather than “profiling” because the
process involves “collecting data over time and across Web pages
to determine or predict consumer characteristics or preferences
for use in and delivery on the Web”.
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young people27 must be proclaimed.
Adaptation and participation: “Since the child is a person who is
still developing, the exercise of their rights must adapt to their level
of physical and psychological development. Not only are children in
the process of developing, but they have a right to this devel-
opment”. and progressively to participate fully in the deci-
sions concerning themselves and therefore to have their own
privacy increasingly protected including against their tradi-
tional protectors (parents or educators). All sociological
reports reveal that the use of Internet applications, the
perception of risks and the negative impact as regards illegal
or harmful materials considerably vary in function among the
different age groups. Common sense tells us that a ten year
old child has to be protected in a different way from someone
who is 18 years old. Particularly it would seem that beyond 13
years of age, male users are better than female users in
identifying risk; they are web 2.0 ‘experts’ and develop strat-
egies especially as regards the use of e-Id technologies for
avoiding privacy threats. JRC report28 pinpoints that they
consider that the protection of their data is their own
responsibility: “They do not attribute responsibility for the protec-
tion of their data to governments or police and courts. Instead they
are asking for tools that give them more direct control of their own
identity and data”. That consideration leads to a view that the
adoption of stricter regulations, like the US COPPA, for minors
13 years aged or less is appropriate. In the same way it might
be useful to consider the importance of systems verifying the
age-appropriateness of users according to the financial or
moral harm theymight suffer. So it is important to distinguish
between different age groups when child audiences are tar-
geted, starting from amuch younger age (6 years old) until the
age of civil majority (18 years). For instance, to participate in
auction platforms this must be restricted to youngsters of 16
years or more. As regards the legal validity of children’s
consent, it must be taken into consideration both the age of
the minor and the economic value of the transaction. It is the
responsibility of the service provider to ensure that their
service are age appropriate for the potential audience and to
take the needed precautions and measures in order to avoid
any disproportionate risks. On the contrary we have to
consider that certain minors, due to their age, ought to be
viewed as adults since they are able to take their own
responsibility therefore suggesting that their consent is valid.
As regards the participation principle, it means at the micro
level that the point of view of minors must be heard through
appropriate means. The recent debate launched by FACE-
BOOK about a new version of its privacy policy is an exemplar.
It shows clearly that youngsters are concerned by the way the
digital services are creating new risks and have certain ideas26 A. Rouvroy, «Réinventer l’art d’oublier et de se faire oublier
dans la société de l’information?», in La sécurité de l’individu
numérisé. Réflexions prospectives et internationales., 2008, pp.
249e278.
27 As it is the case in the Safer social network principles (on
these principles, see hereinafter). Under these principles, SNS
providers must “take steps to ensure that private profiles of users
registered under the age of 180 are not searchable”. The same idea is
submitted by the FTC.
28 JRC Report mentioned above footnote, p. 58.about the way to manage them. At the macro level and
according to Art. 12 of the UNCRC (United Nations Convention
on the rights of the Child), children need to express their views
in dialog with other stakeholders on decisions affecting their
life. It means that they must be represented in an appropriate
manner in the different institutions in charge of defining
Information society policies.29
Responsibility: Shared responsibilities must be established
between all the actors following the principles of (i) the
increasing responsibility of the children and (ii) the best
placed actor for avoiding the damage or the cause of the
damage suffered by children. The recently adopted Safer
Social Networking Principles for the EU, drafted by SNS
providers in consultation with the EU Commission in the
context of the Safer Internet Programme “Empowering and
Protecting Children Online”, illustrates the concrete significance
of this principle: “In order to achieve an appropriate protec-
tion, assignation of different levels of responsibilities and
competences to different actors (multi-stakeholders approach) is
required:
 Parents, teachers and other carers: have an important role to play
in both educating and fostering an ongoing dialogue with children
and young people in their care about safe and responsible online
behaviour
 Service providers should provide targeted, easily accessible and
up-to-date information and tools to assist them in doing so.
Providers should also explore ways to work with educators,
governments and other stakeholders to create resources and other
educational vehicles. They must cooperate with governmental
authorities and provide to them an updating as regards the new
applications developed.
 Governments and public bodies should provide children and young
people with the knowledge and skills to navigate the Internet
safely. Governments should ensure that e-safety curricula that
accurately reflect current Internet services and behaviours are
delivered in schools. Governments should also ensure that law
enforcement agents and those working in the criminal justice
system are equipped with the appropriate training tools and
resources necessary to effectively combat criminal activity con-
ducted online. Governments should work together to ensure that
the frameworks for cross-border coordination are effective and
efficient
 Police and other law enforcement bodies: should ensure that offi-
cers have appropriate and relevant training and resources for
investigating and prosecuting the illegal use of online services.
Service providers and law enforcement bodies should work
collaboratively to share their knowledge of their services and to
support investigations in line with applicable laws.
 Civil society: as a whole, and through bodies such as child
protection agencies, youth organisations and, counselling
services, should collaborate with SNS providers and governments
through consultation, dialogue or working groups that address
their mutual target groups and challenges online. Increasingly,29 As proposed by the Communication from the Commission
(COM(2006))367 final: “Towards an EU Strategy on the rights of the
Child”. See also, the point 2.2 of the Annex 2 of the Safer Internet
programme 2009e2013: “Stimulating the involvement of children and
young people in creating a safer online environment”.
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health, social care and support organisations to raise awareness,
educate and to deliver counselling and support to young people
online, a development which potentially has many positive
outcomes.”
Undoubtedly, children as users have to accept greater
responsibility that increases with their progressive maturity.
They have to respect the terms of use and other guidelines to
the extent they are aware of their existence (or should have
been since appropriate means to draw the individual’s
attention to them have been used by the service provider) and
are able to correctly understand these documents. They must
use the different tools and mechanisms offered to them for
protecting themselves, people and communities in which
they form part and participate.31 Recommendation Rec(2006)12, Sept 27 2006 empowering
children in the new ICT environment “Recalling Recommendation
Rec(2006)12 of the Committee of Ministers on empowering children in
the new information and communications environment, which under-
lines the importance of information literacy and training strategies for
children to enable them to better understand and deal with content (for
example violence and self-harm, pornography, discrimination and
racism) and behaviours (such as grooming, bullying, harassment or
stalking) carrying a risk of harm, thereby promoting a greater sense of
confidence, well-being and respect for others in the new information and
communications environment;” On that issue and the need to envisage
differently the education to the use of new media, see our TIRO report,
p. 266 and ff.
32 “Safer Internet and online technologies for children”, Summary of3. Section 2: how the law is promoting
different regulatory tools?: an inter-normative
approach of the Children’s protection
In order to achieve the protection of children, four main
complementary types of tools are prescribed by European Insti-
tutions. At the EU level, the Safer internet Programme was
recently renewed for the period 2009e2013.30 This aims at
empowering and protecting children and young people when
in charge of the coordination, overview and assessment of all
these relevant tools. Awareness definitively constitutes a first
line of EU and Council of Europe concerns. All the texts about
the topic mention the need to develop self-regulation and
technological solutions (Children’s Protection Enhancing
Technologies, CPETS) as the most adequate way to formulate
evolving and innovative ways to ensure the adequate
protection. Complementary to this second approach is the
need to better define and strengthen the liability of service
providers, especially the new intermediaries such as the
search engines, theWeb 2.0 platform operators. This is clearly
envisaged. Finally, the reinforcement of criminal provisions
and the increasing LEA powers are considered as essential in
last recourse to fight against the most serious infringements.
Each of these means will be the object of the following rele-
vant developments:
3.1. Awareness
Point 3 of the Safer Internet Programme addresses the issue in
these terms: “The activitieswill be aimedat increasing the awareness
of the public” by providing adequate information about risks and
ways to deal with them. A major and positive role needs to be
attributed to the schools through an adequate mandatory
educational programme (need for teachers’ education) and to
ensure that what Council of Europe calls “Media Literacy” or30 The 2009e2013 Safer Internet Programme (Budget 655
millions) has as ambition to tackle new issues like the raise of
web 2.0 application, mobile technologies, infringements like
grooming and cyber bullying. In order to ensure a better coordi-
nation and a better awareness between all stakeholders, the
Programme sets up (Point 4) a “Knowledge Base” identifying all
activities about online safety of young people.“Info-competencies” is taught.31 Besides that initiative,
different actions are envisaged which are listed by the Safer
Internet Programme: exchange of best practices, provision of
contact points where parents and children might receive
information about how to stay safe in an online environment,
financial support for awareness tools, etc. The programme also
underlines theobligationof eachof theactors intervening in the
provision of online services accessible for young people to
deliver specific information related to the activities and services
provided by them. The online public consultation32 launched in
the context of the preparation of the Safer Internet programme
had proposed a lot of other actions, notably the involvement of
publicmedia (Press, radio, TV). The consultation countenanced
the interesting ideaofusingpeers fordisseminatingappropriate
information about risks and solutions in the cyber community
and suggested a “five steps approach” for specific target young
people groups (i) Knowledge, (ii) Approval, (iii) Intention, (iv)
Practice, and (v) Advocacy.3.2. Self and co-regulation
Already, the 1998 recommendation on the protection of
minors33 considered that either self-regulation and/or co-
regulation (to be defined as an effective mix of public and
private initiatives) ought to be the pillars of an effective
protection in cyberspace:
“The industrial sectors and parties concerned are encouraged to
cooperate with the relevant authorities in setting up structures
representing all parties concerned; the aim is to facilitate partic-
ipation in coordination efforts concerning the protection of minors
and human dignity on both a European and an international
level; cooperate in drawing up codes of conduct for the protection
of minors and human dignity applying to online services; develop
on a voluntary basis new means of protecting minors and
informing viewers; collaborate in the follow-up and regular
evaluation of initiatives carried out on a national level concerning
the application of this recommendation”.the results of the online Public consultation and 20e21 June 2007
Safer Internet Forum Report, EU Commission, Report available on
the Safer Internet website.
33 Council Recommendation 98/560/EC on the protection of
minors and human dignity in audiovisual and information
services (1998). That assertion is repeated by a lot of other EU and
Council of Europe documents, see on that issue the list proposed
by us in the TIRO report (p. 239 and ff., footnotes 152 and ff).
37 See on that issue particularly the report on cross media rating
and classification and age verification solutions, Safer Internet
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regulation34:
“Aware of self-regulatory initiatives for the removal of illegal
content and the protection of users against harmful content taken
by the new communications and information industries, some-
times in cooperation with the state, as well as of the existence of
technical standards and devices enabling users to select and filter
content; Desirous to promote and strengthen self-regulation and
user protection against illegal or harmful content,”
All official EU documents are promoting and stimulating at
all the levels self-regulatory or co-regulatory initiatives.35 For
instance, onMay 26, 2003, the EUCouncil decided to extend for
two years the previous Decision andAction Plan for promoting
the safer use of the Internet by combating illegal and harmful
content on global networks. The Decision focused on the need
to reinforce a certain number of actions, deemed as co-regu-
latorymeasures, insofar as their enforcement required the full
support, including financial and administrative support, of the
Member States. This included completing and improving the
existing network of hotlines, ensuring cooperation between
self-regulatory initiatives, development of quality site labels,
benchmarking of filtering software and services, promotion of
self-rating systems,36 etc. So in particular the EU Commission
“has always supported of industry self-regulation which enables
industry to create a system by which they can deal rapidly with any
kind of new issues that might come on”.
A broad range of means might be developed in that
perspective. One might distinguish different types amongst
these means. Certain are aimed to produce norms so best
practices and codes of conduct or companies’ privacy policies
or terms of use are defining the way the service provider will
act. Others are developed to oversee whether the self-regu-
lated bodies are effectively respecting their own commit-
ments. On that point, labelling systems, rating systems or
hotlines (mechanisms put at the disposal of users to report
violations of terms of use by other users) have to be evoked.
Beyond that, in case of evidence of non-compliance, initia-
tives like ADR (alternative dispute resolution mechanisms) or
ODR (Online Dispute Resolution systems) might be set up by34 Recommendation Rec(2001)8 of the Committee of Ministers to
member states on self-regulation concerning cyber content (self-
regulation and user protection against illegal or harmful content
on new communications and information services) (Adopted by
the Committee of Ministers on 5 September 2001).
35 Co-regulation is defined by the Inter-institutional Agreement “
Better Lawmaking” concluded between EU Commission, EU
Parliament and EU Council of Ministers (Sept. 18, 2003 as follows:
“Co-regulation means the mechanisms whereby a Community legisla-
tive act entrusts the attainment of the objectives defined by the legis-
lative authority to parties which are concerned and recognized in the
field”).
36 See on that point, the Council of Europe recommendation on
profiling techniques, already quoted: “Member states should
encourage the design and implementation of procedures and systems in
accordance with privacy and data protection, already at their planning
stage, notably through the use of privacy-enhancing technologies. They
should also take appropriate measures against the development and use
of technologies which are aimed, wholly or partly, at the illicit circum-
vention of technological measures protecting privacy” (Art. 2.2).the actors themselves. Finally, infringements might be fought
by internet blocking, or other penalties and that without the
intervention of public authorities or jurisdictions.37
In the context of Safer Internet, two major co-regulatory
initiatives38 must be highlighted since they represent an
original way to deal with the problems created by advanced
applications:
 European Framework for Safer Mobile use by Young Teenagers
and Children (Feb.2007) signed by mobile operators. This
framework agreement promotes a self-regulated code of
ethics for industry stakeholders. It contains principles and
measures that the signatories commit themselves to
implementing. It seems, according to a report published by
the GSM industry, that 90% of the code has been enforced
through national codes of conduct.
 Safer Social Networking Principles for EU (Feb. 2009) voluntarily
adoptedbythe industry inFebruary2009andsignedbymostof
the major players. Seven principles are enacted through this
code. These include: 1. Work towards ensuring that services
are age appropriate; 2. Raising awareness of safety messages
and acceptable use policies to users, parents, teachers, ., 3.
Empowering users through tools and technology, 4.
Responding to notifications of illegal content and conduct, .
Furthermore it must be underlined that the document
contains a “self-declaration form”whichdescribes exactly the
way by which the signatory plans to fulfil his obligations.
Towhat extent can it be said that these self-or co-regulatory
solutions are valid from the legal point of view, to be considered
as valid instruments and enforced as such by the judges in case
of conflict. Previous papers39 have elaborated upon the criteria
of legal validity of self-regulation in the ICT environment and,
taking fully into account the plurality of the norms,40 we now
propose three criteria, as follows41:Sept 2008.
38 The two self-regulatory texts might be found on the Safer
Internet Programme website: http://ec.europa.eu/saferinternet.
39 Y. Poullet, How to regulate Internet? New Paradigms for
Internet Governance, in Variations sur le droit de la société de
l’information, Cahier du Crid, p. 130 and ff. See also, C. Marsden
(ed.), Regulating the Global Information Society, Oxford Institute,
2001.
40 About the « pluralisme normatif », that is to say the multiple
possible sources of the norms and their recognizance by the legal
systems, see M. Coipel, Quelques réflexions sur le droit et ses
rapports avec d’autres régulations de la vie sociale, in Gouvernance
de la société de l’information, Cahier du Crid, Bruylant-Bruxelles, p.
44 and ff.; See also, M. Vivant, Cybermonde: droit et droit des
réseaux, Semaine juridique, 969, 1996. L. Senden, SOFT LAW, SELF-
REGULATION AND CO-REGULATION IN EUROPEAN LAW: Where
Do They Meet? ECJL, 2005 available at: www.ejcl.org/91/abs91-3.
html.
41 Y. Poullet, “ICT and co-regulation: towards a new regulatory
approach?”, in Starting points for ICT regulation. Deconstructing
prevalent policy one-liners, The Hague, TMC Asser Press, 2006, pp.
247e259 (Information Technology & law series; 9).
44 J. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: the Formulation of Information
Policy Rules through Technology, 76 Texas Law Rev., 1998,
553e593. On the same point, Y. Poullet, “Technology and Law:
from challenge to Alliance”, dans Information quality regulation:
foundations, perspectives, and applications, BadeneBaden, Nomos
Verlagsgellschaft, 2004, pp. 25e52; and definitively the LESSIG’s
fundamental reflections in “Code and other Laws of Cyberspace”,
New-York, Basic Books, 1999.
45 See particularly, B. du Marais, Autorégulation, régulation et
co-régulation des réseaux, in Le droit international de l’Internet,
G. Chatillon (éd.), Bruylant, 2002, p. 296 et s. About the charac-
teristics of the Internet which justify a self-regulatory decen-
tralized approach rather than the traditional topedown approach
based on a legislative and nationally bounded approach, see D.
POST and D.R. JOHNSON, The New Civic Virtue of the
Net, available at: http://www.stbr.stanford.edu/STLR/Working_
Papers/97_Post1/contents.htm: “The ideal of national debate
among wise elected representatives regarding the overall public
good may be replaced, online at least, by a new architecture of
governance that allows dispensed and complex interactions
among groups of individuals taking unilateral actions and
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question raised by the authors of a norm and its trans-
parency. To what extent, might the legal system accept
a norm elaborated outside of the actors designated by
the Constitution or under constitutional rules? This
quality of the norm means that the authorities in charge
of its creation must be recognised for their authority
by the community or communities required to abide
by the rule that has been enacted. This legitimacy is
obvious as regards the traditional State authorities acting
in conformity with the competence devoted to them by
the Constitution. It is less obvious when the regulation
is the expression of private actors as is the case with
self-regulation, particularly when the latter comprise
obscure associations or even private companies able to
impose their technical standards. On that point we
agree with the Safer Internet approach43 since it insists
on the participation of all the stakeholders mentioned
above and it must be re-emphasised that the two docu-
ments just quoted have been discussed together by
the industry, NG0 and the EU Commission. According to
the Participation Principle, it would have been wise to
enlarge at least from now on, the dialog with Children’s
representatives.
 “Conformity” is “content oriented” and designates the
compliance of normative content vis-à-vis fundamental
societal values; those embedded undoubtedly in the legal
texts but also beyond that to ethical values that need to be
taken into account by the legal system. Again this criterion
is quite easy to satisfy and to verify in case of traditional
texts issued by governmental authorities insofar as these
texts take into consideration existing rules with superior
values. It seemsmore intricate to satisfy this criterion when
the compliance with existing legislative text is not system-
atically checked insofar as these texts are not existing or not
clearly identified. Indeed self-regulation is often a way to
avoid the traditional and constitutionally foreseen regula-
tory methods and procedures of rule-making.
 Finally, there is “effectiveness” which is “respect oriented”. To
what extent, will a norm be effectively respected by those to
whom the norm is addressed? The questions about infor-
mation, about the existence of norms, about the sanctions
and the way in which they might be obtained are central for
determining the effectiveness of a norm. By this criterion,
one means that the addressees of a norm need to be aware
not only of its content but also of the consequences of non-
compliance by addresses who would otherwise be stimu-
lated to follow the rule. The requirement of predictability of
the norm emphasises that clear rules, easily accessible and
made public by appropriate means, must be developed.42 See, on this distinction between “source-oriented tests”,
“content oriented tests” and “effectiveness-oriented tests”, R.
Summers, Towards a better general theory of legal validity, in
Rechtstheorie, 1985, 16, p. 65 and ff.
43 See also the permanent C of E request for a multi-stakeholder
approach in the drafting and evaluation of the codes of ethics and
other self-regulatory documents. On that requirement, H.J.
Kleinsteuber, The Internet between Regulation and Governance,
in Self-regulation, Co-regulation and State regulation, at www.osce.
org/item/13570.html?ch¼93, p.61 and ff.On that point, it is quite clear that technology, as Joel Rei-
denberg44 has pointedout, and self-regulatorymechanisms like
codes of conduct, labelling systems or ODR might produce
additional ways to promote and enforce normative instru-
ments.45Onthat issue,authors insistastotheneed,accordingto
article 6 of theC. of E. HumanRights Convention, for procedural
fairness to be ensured.46 In the case of the two abovementioned
documents it is pitiful that nothing has been mentioned as
regards the sanctions a company, signatory of the self-regula-
tory document will be subjected to for non-compliance.473.3. Technological measures
In addition to the other tools, technical solutions are consid-
ered to be essential. Effective mechanisms to trace, filter,
analyse or block websites or individuals acting in an illegal or
harmful way must be found in order to ensure effective
protection within the cyberspace environment. Examples
include: PICS solutionwith automated analysis of the content;
automated systems of age control; and filtering systems with
automated blocking of access to websites. In the alternative,
technological measures might be implemented to ensure that
young users surf safely on the Net. In regard to this issue E-id,
allowing an anonymous surfing, encryption mechanisms,
access control mechanisms or other PETS, .must be high-
lighted. Once again, the implementation of these various
technological measures is clearly supported by the EU and C.seeking more local goods and solutions. Instead of attempting to
rely even upon the best of our democratic traditions to create
a single set of laws imposed on the net from the topedown .”.
46 N. Suzor, The role of the Law in virtual communities, forth-
coming BTLJ, 2011, p. 43 and ff.
47 See in that sense the declaration in the Safer Social
Networking Principles for the EU: “While providers will support all
seven principles, it is for each provider to judge where and how far they
will apply the document’s specific recommendations. These principles
are aspirational and not prescriptive or legally binding, but are offered to
service providers with a strong recommendation for their use.”
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empower users through tools and technology implementing
protective solutions by default; (ii) to make a prior assessment
to determine the technological measures to be implemented
in relation to the services offered and the targeted audience;
and (iii) to make recourse to protective measures, whenever it
is reasonable to foresee potential damage.49
Beyond the call for robust and valid technological systems
protecting children, it is conceivable, on the basis ofwhatmight
happen within current privacy regulatory debates, that new
ideas might be introduced that extend far beyond the limited
sphere of data protection. Let us return to the privacy debates.
Progressively, grounding their reasoning on the Preamble 2
Directive 95/46: “Data processing systems are designed to serveman:
(.) they must . respect their fundamental rights and freedoms, in
particular the right to privacy, and contribute to economic and social
progress, trade expansion and the well-being of the individuals”: the
Article29WorkingParty in itsOpiniononRFID (Jan. 19, 2005) and
the EU Commission’s Recommendation of May 2009 are
asserting a liability not only as regards data controllers or
providersasspecified in theDataProtectionDirectivebutalsoas
regards information systems designers and terminal equip-
mentproducers. It is theirduty toembed intheirproductsand in
the design of their information systems the tools needed to
comply with privacy legislation requirements.
Thisapproach, called “PrivacybyDesign”,50 is thusbasedon
some early thinking in the area first framed in French law in
1978 and recalled by the Recital 2 of the EU Directive 95/46:
“Information technology should be at the service of every citizen. Its48 See particularly the Council of Europe Recommendation Rec
(2001)8 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on self-
regulation concerning cyber content (self-regulation and user
protection against illegal or harmful content on new communi-
cations and information services), Adopted by the Committee of
Ministers on 5 September 2001: 9. “Member states should encourage the
development of a wide range of search tools and filtering profiles, which
provide users with the ability to select content on the basis of content
descriptors”. 11. “Member states should encourage the use of conditional
access tools by content and service providers in relation to content
harmful to minors, such as age-verification systems, personal identifi-
cation codes, passwords, encryption and decoding systems or access
through cards with an electronic code”.
49 See for instance the Art. 27 of the Audio Visual Media Service
(AVMS) Directive about content which might seriously impair
minors.
50 As asserted by Anne CAVIOUKAN, DPA Commissioner from
Ontario (Canada) in its introductory remarks to the Privacy
Guidelines for RFID Information Systems available on the web-
site: http://www.ipc.on.ca: “Privacy and Security must be built in
from the Outset e at the design Stage”. Examples of privacy by
design include the road per-use payment system proposed in DE
JONGE and JACOBS (“Privacy-friendly electronic traffic pricing via
commits”, Proceedings of the Workshop of Formal Aspects of Security
and Trust (FAST 2008), Springer Verlag Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, 5491) in which the car journeys are not sent to a central
server for fee computation but kept on the on board computer
(and still auditable in case of dispute). Another illustration of the
approach is the ambient intelligence architecture put forward in
Le METAYER (“A formal privacy management framework”,
Proceedings of the Workshop of Formal Aspects of Securiy and Trust
(FAST 2008), Springer Verlag Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
5491, pp 162e176) which involves “privacy agents” in charge of
managing and protecting personal data.development shall take place in the context of international coopera-
tion. It shall not violate human identity, human rights, privacy, or
individual or public liberties”. Based on these texts, Data Protec-
tionAuthorities have consistently confirmed the principle that
the responsibility for protecting the data of any users lies with
the suppliers of terminal equipment and those creating the
infrastructures, as they are responsible for the risks they have
created. The DPA51 and EU Commission52 have gone a step
further when dealing with the emerging RFID technology. In
order to measure the privacy risks linked with the dissemina-
tion of RFID and its use, they have placed on the shoulders of
the RFID operators53 an obligation to “conduct systematically an
assessment of the applications and implementation for the protection
of privacy and54 data protection, including whether the appli-
cation could be used to monitor an individual. The level of
detail of the assessment should be appropriate to the privacy
riskspossiblyassociatedwith theapplication; takeappropriate
technical and organisational measures to ensure the protec-
tion of personal data and privacy; designate a person or group
of persons responsible for a continuous assessment.; make
available the assessment to the competent authority at least
six weeks before the deployment of the application; (.)”.
This obligation to produce a ‘Technology Assessment’ on
privacy risks55 and to make this assessment publicly and indi-
vidually available constitutes, in our opinion, the first regulatory
assertion of the necessity to take fully into account, at an early
stage of conception of an information system, the privacy risks
linked with the deployment of such technology. It is quite inter-
esting to see how far this obligation will be enlarged to embrace
all invasive and ubiquitous technologies that put people at risk
and which will characterize our future Information Society.
To what extent this trend imposes data protection by
design and a privacy assessment might be more deeply
embedded in today’s debate that it is currently. To what
extent can it be said that by creating information systems
affecting children in particular that the operator of these
complex systems like SNS, Video service providers or mobile51 Working paper on the questions of data protection posed by RFID
technology, January 19, 2005, WP No. 105 available on the European
Commission website: http://www.ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/
privacy/docs/wpdocs/2005/wp105_fr.pdf.
52 Commission Recommendation of May, 12, 2009 (C (2009) 3200
Final) on the implementation of privacy and data protection
principles in applications supported by radio-frequency
identification.
53 The ‘operator’ is defined by the Commission Recommendation
as ‘the natural or legal person, public authority, agency, or any other
body, which alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and
means of operating an application, including controllers of personal data
using on RFID application”. It must be underlined again that this
concept designates a category of persons broader than the ‘data
controllers’ and might definitively target RFID information
systems or RFID terminal producers.
54 We underline. See infra, our conclusions.
55 On “Privacy Impact Assessment”, see R.Clarke, “Privacy impact
assessment: Its origins and development, [2009] 25 CLSR 123 and
ff. This article provides in two appendices a list of exemplars of
PIA documents and references to guidelines describing different
PIA methodologies.
60 Y. Akdeniz, Who watches the watchmen? The role of filtering
Software in Internet Content regulation, in Self-regulation, Co-
regulation and State regulation, available at www.osce.org/item/
13570.html?ch¼93 p. 101 and ff. See also, the US decision of the
Supreme Court in Aschcroft Attorney General v. Aclu et al, June
2004 at http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/03-218ZS.html:
“Filtering software is not a perfect solution because it may block some
materials not harmful to minors and fail to catch some that are”.
61 “In this context, member states should:
i facilitate the development of strategies to identify content
carrying a risk of harm for children and young people, taking
into account the diversity of cultures, values and opinions;
ii. cooperate with the private sector and civil society to avoid
over-protection of children and young people by, inter alia,
supporting research and development for the production of
“intelligent” filters that take more account of the context in
which the information is provided (for example by differen-
tiating between harmful content itself and unproblematic
references to it, such asmay be found on scientificwebsites);
iii. facilitate and promote initiatives that assist parents and
educators in the selection and use of developmental-age
appropriate filters for children and young people;
iv. inform children and young people about the benefits and
dangers of Internet content and its filtering as part of media
education strategies in formal and non-formal education.
Furthermore, the private sector should be encouraged to:
i develop “intelligent” filters offering developmental-age
appropriate filtering which can be adapted to follow the
child’s progress and age while, at the same time, ensuring
that filtering does not occur when the content is deemed
neither harmful nor unsuitable for the groupwhich the filter
has been activated to protect;
ii. cooperate with self- and co-regulatory bodies in order to
develop standards for developmental-age appropriate
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Certain assertions present in documents we have referred to,
clearly are going in this direction. So, in the Safer Social
Networking Principles, the third Principle enunciates:
“Providers should employ tools and technologies to assist children
and young people in managing their experiences on their services,
particularly with regards to inappropriate or unwanted content
and conduct. Service providers should make an assessment of
what measures, to implement based on the services being offered
and the intended audience These measures that can help
to minimize the risk. may include for example .”.57
The importance given in the 2009e2013 Safer Internet
Programme to the need for the operators and information
systems designers to develop “technical solutions for dealing
adequately with illegal and tackle harmful conduct online” illus-
trates the same concern.
If both technological solutions and self- and co-regulation
might be considered as positive ways to deal with problems
raised by the online services and bring adequate solutions to
protect young people, their impact and validity in certain cases
are questionable, since they might affect fundamental liberties.
So the EDPS58 has delivered a quite interesting opinion about the
proposal submitted by the Commission concerning the new
Safer Internet Programme andhas underlined the absolute need
to take fully intoconsideration theprivacy issuesofallactors,not
only children when certain self-regulatory measures are taken.
EDPS notably states that “In an area where freedom of speech, access
to information, privacy and other fundamental rights are at stake, the
intervention of private actors raises the questions of proportionality of
the means used”. Very recently59 the EDPS questioned quite
severely the possibility envisaged by the proposal for a Directive
on combating the sexual abuse, sexual exploitation of children
and child pornography already discussed, raising strong
concerns about the envisaged enactment of voluntary action by
Internet Services Providers to block the Internet pages on the
basis of code of conduct and guidelines: “The EDPS has in previous
opinions expressed his concerns regarding themonitoring of individuals
by private sector actors (e.g. ISP’s or copyright holders), in areas that are
in principle under the competence of Law enforcement authorities.”56 See as regards mobile operators, certain recommendations
proposed by the EU Framework for Safe Mobile Use by younger
Teenagers and Children: “Individual mobile providers should offer
capabilities which can be used by parents to customize access to content
by children using mobiles..”.or “Appropriate means to control access to
content should also be applied where content is supplied by contracted
providers of third parties, commercial content which would be classified
as only suitable for adult customers in equivalent media”.
57 The enumeration contains provisions about measures for
forbidding searches concerning people registered as under age 18,
setting the default for full profiling, giving users control over who
can access their profile, giving users the option to pre-moderate
comments of other users before being published on their profile.
58 EDPS, Opinion on the proposal for a Revision of the EU parlia-
ment and of the Council establishing a multi-annual Community
Programme on protecting children using the Internet and other
Communication technologies. June 23, 2009, OJ 7.1.2009.
59 EDPS, Opinion on the proposal for a Directive cn combating the
sexual abuse, sexual exploitation of children and child pornog-
raphy, repealing Framework decision 2004/68/JHA, May 10, 2010.In the same line of argument the Council of Europe
Recommendation (2008) on measures to promote the respect
for freedom of expression and information with regard to
internet filters denunciates certain negative impacts that
Internet filters might have on freedom of expression.60
Although generally supporting “voluntary and responsible
use of Internet filters,” the Council61 agreed that filters could
legitimately be deployed in public places such as schools orrating systems for content carrying a risk of harm, taking
into account the diversity of cultures, values and opinions;
iii. develop, in co-operation with civil society, common labels
for filters to assist parents and educators in making
informed choices when acquiring filters and to certify that
they meet certain quality requirements;
iv. promote the interoperability of systems for the self-classi-
fication of content by providers and help to increase
awareness about the potential benefits and dangers of such
classification models.
Moreover, civil society should be encouraged to:
i debate and share their experiences and knowledge when
assessingandraisingawarenessof thedevelopmentanduseof
filters as a protective measure for children and young people;
ii regularly monitor and analyse the use and impact of filters
for children and young people, with particular regard to
their effectiveness and their contribution to the exercise
and enjoyment of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by
Article 10 and other provisions of the European Convention
on Human Rights”.
62 On the SNS obligations see the Opinion 5/2009 of the Art. 29 W.
P dated from June 12, 2009 on Social Networking, W.P. 163. The
opinion contains a specific chapter on the problem of children.
63 “Safer Internet and Online Technologies for Children”, Summary of
the results of the online public consultation, Safer Internet Forum
report, EU Commission, June 2007. p.7.
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such filtering to prevent it from becoming overbroad. Those
limits are sensible. So we note that users must be able to
signal when content is being filtered and have a simple way to
challenge the accuracy of the filter. Manual overrides should
be put in place when practical so that users can quickly obtain
access to blocked material, etc.
Transparency about the filtering methods used; which
criteria; which procedure for fixing these criteria; how the
system functions; and who is responsible for it: i.e. who
developed the filtering systems; who controls their func-
tioning andwhat auditingmethods are available all have to be
ensured. This paper will return to the delicate question of the
need for balance between different values and the need to
protect children, on the one hand and the importance of
respecting fundamental liberties like privacy or freedom of
expression on the other.
3.4. Liability
As stated previously the new Internet applications, particu-
larly Web 2.0 such as social network services and video
posting or e-gaming services (for instance: YouTube, Daily-
motion, Myspace, Facebook, Wikipédia blogs, Second Life)
are the new intermediaries. Their responsibility in case of
harm provoked by users of their services is questionable. Is
Art. 14 of the e-commerce Directive, for example, which
provides a large exoneration of liability for hosting services
providers, applicable to these new categories of service
providers? To solve that question, we must take into
consideration that the service provided by these new cate-
gories of intermediaries is not limited to technical activities
such as is true in the case of pure hosting providers. The
limitation of activities grounded upon the specific regime of
liability enacted by the article 14 and 15 of the e-commerce
directive may not then sit so easily upon these new cate-
gories of intermediaries. Indeed the latter are classifying and
storing received information and, according to that infor-
mation, are either addressing advertisements to those users
themselves or permitting third parties to do so who have
entered into a contract with them, as well as putting at the
disposal of users access to a certain number of applications
that create additional risks for them and any other recipi-
ents of the information posted. It is submitted that, taking
these additional activities into account, these new
intermediaries bear more liability than hosting providers for
their actions. It does not mean that they are liable each time
a harmful or illegal content is posted and provokes damages.
It is quite obvious that we have to fix this liability according
to the means developed or required according to the specific
service being delivered. So it is quite clear that if YouTube,
who is responsible for classifying videos posted by its users,
fails to block a priori access to videos with paedophilia
content, that it will be liable for not having used adequate
filtering and screening systems to control such postings. The
same occurs if YouTube fails to use recognised systems for
controlling the age of users and allows young people to
access content rated as ‘adults only’. The obligation to use
appropriate and reasonable self-regulatory means and
technical tools for diminishing the risks or for avoidingthem is their responsibility and the failure to respect of this
obligation should lead to their liability, unless evidence can
be adduced that the use of these tools in the particular
circumstances was not sufficient to avoid the harms
incurred by the user.
What do we mean by ‘appropriate self-regulatory
measures and technological tools? The court might refer to
codes of conduct, such as the principles enacted by the EU
Safer Internet Programme as a “rule of art”. It might also refer
to standards developed by institutions like INHOPE or other
recognised standardisation authorities.
Furthermore, it could well be that the service provider is
liable under other specific legislation. For instance, an SNS
provider has personal data controller obligations62 to inform
users about processing purposes and to use adequate security
measures as regards the integrity, availability and confiden-
tiality of the personal data. SNS has to obtain from the user his
or her informed free and specific consent for marketing uses
of his or her data. The access to the data stored including the
profile must be offered through easy and user friendly
mechanisms. The data must be deleted upon the termination
of the contract concluded with the user. Under the e-
commerce directive, certain information must be given about
the service provider, advertisementsmust be clearly identified
and access to the terms of use offered through easy to use
mechanisms.
3.5. Criminal provisions and LEA competences - major
trends:
“Prime responsibility for fighting against any illegal activities
and illegal content, such a child sexual abusematerial, should
rest with the police. The capacity of law enforcement bodies
need to be strengthened in this role so that they can take
a more proactive approach and participate in cross-border
cooperation such as in the organisation of more sting opera-
tions and in respect of hotlines and policy generally to combat
online child abuse”.63 The recently adopted Treaty on the
European Union underlines the importance of protecting chil-
dren by enacting in its article 29:
“Without prejudice to the powers of the European Community,
the Union’s objective shall be to provide citizens with a high level
of safety within an area of freedom, security and justice by
developing common action among the Member States in the fields
of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters and by
preventing and combating racism and xenophobia. That objective
shall be achieved by preventing and combating crime, organised
or otherwise, in particular terrorism, trafficking in persons and
offences against children .”
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dren and child pornography is in course of revision64 and is an
illustration of this trend towards a “high level of security through
measures to prevent and combat crime which includes child sexual
abuses and child sexual exploitation”.
Three main points need to be emphasised as regards the
increasing competence granted to LEA. First, new texts are
enlarging the number of offences by criminalising new
forms of abuse using the Internet. So, for instance, the
amendments proposed by the Commission defines new
criminal offences related to the use of IT such as online
pornographic performances, or knowingly obtaining access
to child pornography, even in cases where there is no
downloading or storing of the images and thus without any
“possession” traditionally required by the criminal provi-
sions. It includes also the criminalisation of “grooming”
activities, that is to say solicitation of children for sexual
purposes. Second, based on the Council of Europe Conven-
tion on Cyber crime,65 a better international cooperation
between LEAs grounded on a common definition of offences
is foreseen.
This cooperation constitutes an adequate answer to the
global nature of the Internet. In the recently approved EU
Youth Strategy (Council Resolution Nov. 27, 2009), the EU
authorities anchor their policy into a global policy protecting
children. This strengthened and duly established cooperation
between LEA is regarded as absolutely necessary when the
offending content is located or removed to websites outside of
EU. The proposal to allow blocking of websites with child
abuse content, developed by the EU Commission, responds
also to the concerns raised by the global character of the
Internet. Another suggestion is to create interoperable
national databases of websites containing child pornography
materials. Third, as regards investigative methods, coopera-
tion between e-communications service providers and certain
service providers like SNS on the one hand and LEA on the
other is foreseen by legislative provisions or by codes of
conduct.66 Furthermore, the obligation for e-communication
services providers to keep storage of traffic data during64 Council Framework Decision 2004/JHA of Dec. 22, 2003 on the
sexual exploitation of children and child pornography. See the
Commission proposal for a Council framework decision
combating the sexual abuse, sexual exploitation of children and
child pornography, March 29, 2010, See also the Council of Europe
Convention CETS, n201 on the protection of children against
sexual exploitation and sexual abuse which is at the basis for the
improvements suggested by the Commission.
65 Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime STS n185, Nov.
15, 2001. It is quite interesting to denote that this Convention is
opened to the signature of non member states of the Council of
Europe. US and Japan for instance have ratified the CoE
Convention which might be considered more and more as an
international global standard. That situation allows an interna-
tional cooperation far beyond EU or even Council of Europe
countries.
66 See Principle 5 of the Safer Social Network Principles (already
quoted): “Service providers should have in place arrangements to share
reports of illegal content or conduct with relevant law enforcement
bodies and/or hotlines. Providers may consider including links to other
local agencies or organisations, for example relevant InHope services
and LEA.”a period between six months and two years as prescribed by
the Directive on Data retention67 will facilitate the investiga-
tion of LEA.
Certain of the extensions to these LEA prerogatives raise
questions as regards the respect of fundamental liberties,
particularly privacy, freedom of expression and human
dignity. EDPS68 commented quite forcefully about the Safer
Internet Programme for children as follows:
“The European Parliament has recently adopted a Resolution69
stressing the need for a solution in compliance with the funda-
mental Rights of individuals. In point 25 of its resolution, it states
that ’the Internet is a vast platform for cultural expression access
to knowledge and participation in European creative, bringing
generations together through the information society, the
Parliament calls on the Commission and the Member states to
avoid adopting measures conflicting with civil liberties and
human rights and with the principles of proportionality, effec-
tiveness and dissuasiveness, such as the interruption of the
Internet’. The EDPS considers that a balance has to be found
between the legitimate objective to fight against illegal content
and the appropriate nature of the means used. It recalls that any
action of surveillance of telecommunications networks, where
necessary in specific cases should be the task of law enforcement
authorities.”
What EDPS has clearly in mind is what authors call the
“public order clause” which seeks to balance conditional
fundamental freedoms such as the liberties or human rights
mentioned above with the rights or interests of third parties.
For instance, if a blocking measure is envisaged against
a child having violated a copyright, the judge according to the
Council of Europe Convention, will need to assess to what
extent a child’s right to freedom of expression and to privacy
might be counterbalanced by the violation of the IPR of the
author? To solve that problem, a three step evaluation is
needed for validating the interference with conditional
human rights70:
 respect for the principle of lawfulness constitutes the first
condition: the Lawmust be accessible and a norm cannot be
viewed as a law if its content is not formulated with
sufficient precision to enable people targeted by the law
(which might be in casu a child) to regulate his or her
conduct. It is of course true that only public regulation and
not self-regulatory measures can hinder or limit the exer-
cise of a freedom;
 the obligation to pursue a legitimate aim is a second crite-
rion of the validity of any interference. So it might be67 Directive 2006/24/EC of March 15, 2006 on the retention of data
generated or processed in connection with the provision of
publicly available electronic communications services or of
public communications networks.
68 EDPS, Opinion already quoted sura footnote 54.
69 European Parliament Resolution, April 11, 2019 on cultural
industries in Europe (2007:2153 (INI) point 25).
70 About a similar approach, read C. Callanan et al, Internet
blocking balancing cybercrime responses in democratic societies, Report
prepared within the framework of Open Society Institute Fund-
ing, 2009, 33 pages.
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measures, will only be taken if the aim is to protect the
sensibilities of weaker persons like children, but in that case
the restriction must target only children and not other
adults.
 The last point concerns the principle of “necessity in
a democratic society”; what the Court of Strasbourg has
defined as responding to a pressing social need and
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, that is to say
that no alternative, less intrusive, or limited incursion upon
liberty is possible.4. Conclusions
Let us try to summarize the reflections in this paper. Defin-
itively we have tried to demonstrate that privacy, as a capa-
bility and condition for self development in a democratic
society, might be seen as the ‘red thread’ operating
throughout the analysis. We consider that even if children
(or young people) are vulnerable, due to their immaturity,
access to the Internet and its multiple applications do
represent an essential tool for the development of their
personality. Information Communication Technologies
(ICTs), with their ubiquitous and universal characteristics,
are drastically modifying our environment as well as our
economic and social relationships. This trend will increase
in the future in a way which is only partially predictable at
this time. ICT are used in an increasing number of contexts
and are offering to each of us a place without limits where
we are able to better express ourselves, where we have
access to more and more personal services, but also where
the physical or social barriers which separated the various
visions of the world tend to disappear. In this sense, ICTs
create a unique opportunity to develop ourselves and to
enter into a dialog founded on the recognizance of a large
diversity of opinions. This might contribute to a cultural,
economic, intellectual, democratic and human enrichment
of the global society. Even if restrictions to that access are
needed for obvious reasons and if protective measures have
to be taken, these restrictions and protective measures must
be limited according to the proportionality principle and
definitively a positive approach fostering awareness and
participation of youngsters.Having recalled that fundamental privacy concern, we have
tried to demonstrate that the EU policy is founded on threefold
approach characterized as follows:
 A multi-stakeholder approach
 A multi-normative approach taking fully into consideration
and assessing the technological landscape and applications
 The fundamental roles of the State not only to promote the
dialog between all these stakeholders and to encourage
them to fix appropriate and evolving rules for the virtual
communities. Overall, beyond that, to recall our funda-
mental liberties including those in development as regards
young people and therefore the need for their protection, to
fix by sound compromise the problem whereby liberties are
in conflict and foster continuously its maintenance as an
evolving context.
As SUZOR71 concluded “So too, in virtual communities, the
boundaries of private law doctrine mediates the relationships
between participants and providers (as they do in disputes
between participants and non participants). The rule of law,
as a discourse that emphasises the legitimacy of governance
and appropriate limits on the exercise of power, provides
a useful framework as a first step to reconceptualising and
evaluating these tensions in communities at the intersection
of the real and the virtual, the social and the economic, and
the public and the private.”
“Whywe need lawyers?” becomes obvious at the end of these
findings. Law has not to be regarded as a system intervening
only for sanctioning. Law is the appropriate tool for creating
the conditions of the dialog between all interested people in
children’s protection, to promote both a multi-normative
methodology at the service of such protection.Meanwhile, the
law has to sustain overall control of these other means for
maintaining the conditions for progress within the limits
imposed by the fundamental principles and liberties of our
democratic societies, while paying attention to their effective
enforcement.1Yves Poullet (yves.poullet@fundp.ac.be) Member CLSR Editorial
Board, Former Director CRID (University of Namur) Professor at the
Faculties of Law and Rector, University of Namur, Belgium.
Based on a paper presented at the e-Youth conference 2010:
http://www.ucsia.org/eyouthAntwerpen, May 27e28 2010.71 N. SUZOR, article quoted above footnote 45, p. 52. See on the
same point, M. Risch, Virtual rule of the Law, draft available at:
http://ssm.com/abstract¼1463583: “Market based regulations such
as contracts lack neutral and consistent enforcement mechanisms. Code
based constraints are often implemented arbitrarily and without notice.
Community norms are often vague, unwritten and are enforced by mob
rules. Autonomous self-regulation is too complex and costly. Real world
laws, no matter how clear and impartial in real space, do not have
a history that gives any confidence about how they might apply in the
virtual activity”.
